ABSTRACT Traditionally, the cellular spectrum is allocated to operators (OPs) through auctions, as ideal mechanisms to discover market prices and allocate scarce resources. Even though spectrum is indeed scarce in sub-6 GHz bands, it becomes abundant in millimeter-wave (mmWave) bands. Interestingly, in that context, it is base station (BS) density which is limiting, and thus a critical factor, due to the outage phenomena in urban environments. Facing BS scarcity is one of the main reasons to foster virtualization techniques aimed at improving utilization and lowering costs. We consider a scenario with an infrastructure provider (InP) owner of a number of BSs and a set of OPs with their users (UEs). We propose a three-phase framework to price network infrastructure slices (NISs) and allocate them to OPs and to efficiently associate UEs with those NISs. The framework stages are: 1) an initial association, 2) a distributed auction mechanism across the BSs to allocate resources to Ops, and 3) a re-association process where the OPs can optimize the NISs they are awarded. The auction incentivizes OPs to bid truthfully and the outcome yields both socially optimal NISs and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) prices. For the re-association phase, we propose deterministic and stochastic exchange-matching algorithms and demonstrate their convergence to stable matching and stableoptimal matching, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to spectrum scarcity below 6 GHz, millimeter-wave (mmWave) bands from 30 GHz up to 100 GHz have been proposed for fifth generation (5G) and beyond cellular networks [1] , [2] . Diverse applications of these networks, from urban street-level outdoor mobile access and backhaul to shopping mall hotspots, have been envisaged by both industry and academia [3] - [6] . Despite the foreseen high-gain antennas at both transmitter and receiver ends to overcome high-path losses at high frequencies, average cell ranges are expected to be short (from 50 to 200 meters), since mmWave signals cannot penetrate most materials (e.g., buildings, vegetation, vehicles, human bodies, etc). Therefore, providing seamless mmWave coverage in urban
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Operators (OPs), however, may be concerned by the great cost of the dense infrastructures that are required to provide coverage to customers in key locations. Indeed, from an economic point of view, it would be difficult for small OPs to sustainably deploy their own BSs [7] . Nevertheless, a scenario in which a neutral OP, neutral third party or infrastructure provider (InP) owns the small cells and shares them with multiple OPs could lower deployment costs and minimize interference while avoiding unnecessarily overlapped BSs [8] . Furthermore, a BS infrastructure open to third parties could facilitate market entry to OPs wishing to extend their networks, and would also encourage the advent of new mmWave services [7] .
Given this observation, we consider an InP owner of mmWave BSs leased to several OPs, each with its own In this work we are interested in the joint allocation of different NISs to the OPs and in the optimal association of heterogeneous UEs to NISs from a business point of view. We want to model a situation in which the InP runs an auction to price infrastructure resources and allocate them to OPs. Auction mechanisms represent a flexible and efficient approach for this kind of allocation of virtualized BS resources. Unlike simple allocation schemes based on fixed pricing, auctions are economically efficient, automatically discover real-time market value, and assign resources to the bidders that value them most [22] .
However, the interdependence between the association of UEs with BSs and the valuation of the different BSs by the OPs makes the problem intractable and implementation difficult in practice. For this reason we propose a heuristic three-phase framework to price NISs and allocate them to OPs and to associate UEs with the NISs.
First, we assume an initial path-loss-based association, a common assumption in mmWave research [2] , [4] , [23] , [24] , so that OPs can assess the performance of the BSs. The OPs will value infrastructure resources according to the quality-of-experience (QoE) they can provide to their UEs.
Second, we assume a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism. The VCG sealed-bid auction can be used as a general purpose mechanism to obtain efficient (socially optimal) allocations of multiple items to buyers and, at the same time, motivate buyers to bid truthfully. We show that the centralized VCG auction problem can be decomposed into local VCG auctions at the BSs. However, from a privacy perspective, since the VCG mechanism requires OPs to reveal valuation functions, the OPs may be reluctant to participate. For this reason, we propose an iterative Vickrey-Dutch auction per BS, which supports truthful bidding in an ex post Nash equilibrium and terminates with an efficient allocation, i.e. the VCG outcome.
Third, we propose a re-association phase immediately on termination of the auction, in which each OP freely manages the awarded NIS and so can optimize associations to maximize payoff (i.e. revenue minus NIS cost). For the combinatorial re-association problem, we propose two novel matching-based deterministic and stochastic exchange matching (DEM and SEM, respectively) algorithms. Matching theory is a recent research topic that allows complex combinatorial problems to be handled by modeling interactions between heterogeneous players that want to be matched and yielding speedy convergence to stable solutions [25] . Self-organizing matching capabilities facilitate the design of distributed algorithms [26] . We demonstrate that the DEM and SEM algorithms converge to stable matching and stableoptimal matching, respectively.
We present empirical results to support our approach. First we demonstrate that infrastructure is far more critical than spectrum in initial mmWave urban scenarios. We then show that the DEM and SEM algorithms outperform other representative association algorithms used as benchmarks. Finally, we evaluate the proposed three-phase framework and show that InP revenue depends on the level of virtualization: increasing the number of RF chains available for sharing reduces OP competition and is economically counterproductive from the InP perspective. Moreover, we show that reassociation significantly improves the payoff of OPs with the result that their NISs are more profitable.
The proposed framework is suitable for practical implementation. First, BSs should include an InP agent responsible for assessing the path-loss of the association with each UE and providing this information to the pertinent OP. Second, OPs know the services subscribed to by their UEs and can estimate the necessary connection quality to provide the desired QoE. Third, each BS's InP agent may perform an auction locally, thus allowing a fully distributed schema. Finally, different virtualization architectures can be used to implement the NISs of OPs, satisfying the requirement for isolation among NISs. For example, each OP could perform all the radio signal processing tasks in a centralized baseband unit (BBU) pool, and, according to a C-RAN architecture, send the I/Q data to the InP agent in each BS [27] . Even though some recent works have studied spectrum and infrastructure sharing in mmWave, as far as we are aware, ours is the first economic mechanism proposed for that purpose.
B. RELATED WORK
Spectrum sharing in mmWave has recently gained significant attention in the literature. A joint beamforming and cell association problem has been formulated to study the feasibility of spectrum sharing according to different coordination levels and beamforming schemes [11] , and a stochastic geometry analysis offers similar insights [12] , demonstrating that shared licenses with less bandwidth achieve the same peruser median rate as exclusive spectrum licenses. Stochastic geometry has also been proposed to analyze spectrum sharing when OP mmWave BSs are co-located [13] .
In general, spectrum sharing is desirable under a noiselimited regime, i.e. it is less beneficial if transmission beam directivity is low or the BSs transmitting in the same band exceed a density of 30/km 2 . Moreover, under a noiselimited regime there is no need for coordination. Indeed, Park et al. [14] confirm that inter-OP cell coordination is useful in spectrum sharing only in the case of extremely dense cells and fairly wide beams, e.g., 30 • or higher. The cited works, however, do not propose any economic mechanism for OPs to share resources profitably. Fund et al. [7] economically analyze infrastructure and spectrum sharing, showing that open deployment is better than open spectrum to foster market entry in mmWave. Specifically, those authors show (i) that open BSs encourage growth, (ii) that OPs may fail to achieve sustainability if they deploy their own BSs, and (iii) that open spectrum does not particularly encourage growth. Therefore, that work has laid the groundwork for the scenarios we consider in our paper, where the InP offers open deployment and the OPs have their own licensed bandwidths but no fixed infrastructure, and for which we propose efficient allocating and pricing mechanisms.
Wireless network virtualization in future cellular networks has been another area of intense research. A distributed game theoretic BS switching-off scheme in a multi-OP environment has been proposed as an energy and cost-saving solution [15] . Using matching with contracts, another study [16] has introduced flow prioritization from over-the-top service providers into the allocation of eNB resource blocks in a shared LTE-A multi-OP environment. Other recent works include auction-based mechanisms to price virtual network resources. Jiang et al. [28] divide network resources into different types of chunks (radio, edge cloud and core cloud chunks) and present a mechanism to price chunks and allocate them to sets of slices. Zhu and Hossain [29] designed a hierarchical two-level combinatorial auction between the InP, the OPs and the UEs, based on a truthful sub-efficient semi-distributed resource allocation framework for wireless virtualization in massive MIMO networks. However, since VCG auctions are used, OPs are required to either reveal their private valuation functions to the InP or to submit all values for all possible combination of resources. We propose instead a descending price auction that better suits private value environments where OPs are not required to reveal so much information. Gu et al. [30] describe offline and online auction mechanisms for OPs to share C-RAN resources efficiently, also using a fractional VCG strategy to yield near-optimal resource provisioning and truthfulness. Zhang et al. [31] present a double auction mechanism for slicing InPs' physical resources in an energy-efficient way to satisfy the diverse quality of service (QoS) demands of the UEs subscribed to each OP, ensuring fairness among InPs. The authors assume that an UE can communicate with several BSs and formulate a flow-level slicing approach with continuous commodities (i.e. rate). In our work, however, we follow an infrastructure-level slicing approach with discrete commodities (i.e. RF chains), where each UE can be associated at most with one BS. Infrastructure-level slicing fits well with multiple OPs that own spectrum rights and that only lease hardware infrastructure (i.e. BSs) from an InP in certain target area [18] . A recent survey of auction mechanisms for virtualization in 5G can be found in [32] . Note that no previous work considers mmWave bands, neither analytically nor numerically [28] - [31] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we define the system model in detail. In Section III we present the mmWave channel and QoE models. Section IV describes the proposed three-phase framework. Section V and Section VI describe the iterative auction mechanism and the re-association algorithms, respectively. In Section VII we provide numerical results that support our proposals. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a mmWave InP, owner of a set B of mmWave BSs. These BSs have a hybrid beamforming architecture, each with N RF b RF chains. We consider a downlink scenario under initial mmWave urban deployment, and so assume BS density < 30 BS/Km 2 , which (according to [2] ) yields an average cell range above ≈ 100 meters.
In addition, we consider a set Z of mobile OPs, each with its own set U z of UEs. The set containing all the UEs is denoted by U = ∪ z U z . Similarly to current cellular networks, we assume that OPs have their own licensed spectrum bands w z , ∀z ∈ Z. However, they do not have their own mmWave BSs and so they need to trade for infrastructure resources to serve the UEs in their bands. We assume an RF chain can be allocated only to a single OP at a time. This assumption, together with the orthogonal spectrum resources per OP, satisfies the desired isolation among NISs in network slicing. Nonetheless, OPs still need to compete to obtain their own NIS.
We assume the InP introduces this competition via an auction process in which OPs bid for different combinations of resources. We assume the InP acts as the auctioneer that hosts and directs the process. In an auction, a bid for an item represents the maximum willingness to pay for that item, i.e. it is a function of how the bidder values the item. In our model, an OP z will value the same set of resources n z differently depending on how its UEs are associated with the physical BSs. Let us denote by µ z the association between the sets B and U z . Also, let µ z (b) ⊆ U z be the set of associated z-UEs at BS b and let |µ z (b)| be its cardinality. We assume that a feasible association requires an UE to be associated with a single BS at most, while a BS can be associated with any UE u ∈ U. Let us specify the set of all feasible associations between sets B and U z as M z . An UE u will prefer to be associated with BS b rather than b if its utility is higher. Let us denote as ϕ u (µ z , n z ) the utility of UE u ∈ U z under z-NIS allocation n z and association µ z . Therefore, depending on the combination of (µ z , n z ), OP z will observe different values. Let us denote one such combination as C z (µ z , n z ) and the set of all combinations for OP z as C z , so that C z (µ z , n z ) ∈ C z . Let V z (C z (µ z , n z )) be the valuation of OP z for combination C z (µ z , n z ). The valuation of NIS n z by OP z can therefore be written as:
We also introduce Boolean variable X z (C z (µ z , n z )) to denote whether or not a specific combination is selected by the InP for OP z during the auction process.
Auctions are generally divided into a winning selection mechanism and a pricing mechanism for the winning bids. We are interested in auctions that are:
• Individually rational, when no bidder is charged more than its bid and no seller is paid less than what it asks.
• Truthful (or incentive-compatible), when, for any bidder, the optimal strategy is to bid with the true value no matter what other bidder strategies are.
• Efficient, so that the sum of valuations of all accepted bids is maximal. Note that bids are equal to the actual valuations when the auction mechanism is truthful. In this paper we consider the VCG sealed-bid auction, which can be used as a general purpose mechanism to obtain efficient (socially optimal) allocations of multiple items to buyers and, at the same time, motivate buyers to bid truthfully.
Considering the previous assumptions of our model, the NIS allocation to each OP z (winner determination problem) can be formulated with the following combinatorial auction:
The complexity of the problem grows exponentially with network size. We therefore propose an alternative heuristic approach, described in Section IV.
III. MMWAVE CHANNEL AND QOE MODELS A. PATH LOSS AND LINK STATES
The mmWave path loss in dB between BS b and UE u is given by
where d is the distance between the BS and the UE, and N (0, χ 2 ) denotes a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and standard deviation χ. Parameters α and β may follow either the ''close-in'' [33] or ''floating-intercept'' path-loss models [34] . For instance, in the former β = 20 log 10 (
) is the path loss at 1 meter, λ c is the wavelength in meters, and α is the path-loss exponent.
Note that α and χ are different for line-of-sight (LOS) and non-LOS (NLOS) links. Moreover, an mmWave link in LOS or NLOS states may experience severe path losses. In that case, the link is in an outage (OUT) state, impeding communication, and thus L(d) = ∞. The addition of this OUT state, which is unusual in microwave bands, fits the actual coverage of mmWave BSs better [34] . In order to distinguish between LOS, NLOS and OUT links, we follow the well-known three-state probabilistic blockage model derived from the experimental measurements in [34] . According to this model, the probability that a link of length d is in each state is given by
where (δ LOS , γ LOS ) and (δ OUT , γ OUT ) are parameters that depend on the propagation scenario and the carrier frequency f c .
B. SINR AND RATE MODEL
We consider the hybrid beamforming architecture in [23] , Thanks to hybrid beamforming, a BS can co-schedule up to N RF b UEs at the same time [35] . The maximum number of co-scheduled UEs is limited by the total number of RF chains. However, the number of associated UEs may be higher. Let Following the approximations in [23] the signal-tointerference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) can be defined by:
where ψ b,u is the combined antenna gain between the transmitter and the receiver, which may be substituted by the
of the number of antennas at both sides, σ 2 N is the thermal noise power, and I is the out-of-cell interference. Term η ZF represents the ZF penalty of co-scheduling (approximated by [23] ),
In general, mmWave networks can be expected to be noiselimited for densities of BSs below 30 BS/Km 2 [4] , [36] (corresponding to an average cell range of 104 meters). Since our model considers an early mmWave network deployment where BS density is not extreme, we assume a negligible impact of term I on the denominator of SINR expression (9) . Let b be the serving BS of UE u. The rate per user (in bits per second or bps) of UE u as served by BS b is defined as (11) where w z is the transmission bandwidth of OP z, to which UE u belongs, and where α, β are the overhead and loss factors, respectively [37] . The model above implies that each UE gets a fraction
| of the resources, which can be achieved using round-robin scheduling.
C. QOE AND UTILITY MODEL OF THE UE
Maximizing the rate of the UEs (or a logarithmic function of the rate) is a common approach in resource allocation problems under the assumption that higher throughput is always better. Alternatively, the concept of quality-of-experience (QoE) is built on the idea that some services are less ratedemanding than others, and hence, it is possible to use the surplus of some services to improve the experience of users accessing the most demanding applications. For instance, in mmWave it is common to use the best path-loss metric to associate UEs and BSs [2] , [4] , [23] , [24] . However, great variation in path loss among links together with heterogeneity in services paves the way to more convenient association rules.
In this paper we consider the mean opinion score (MOS), one of the main subjective evaluation methods to characterize QoE [26] , [38] , [39] , which can also be estimated algorithmically. The MOS expresses the QoE perceived by the UEs as a scale with different levels of perceived satisfaction for a specific service. Using the MOS approach we map the rate metric R u to a set of values Q = {0, 1, 2, · · · , |Q|} depending on a minimum rate R min u and a required rate R rec u . The mapping function can be linear or logarithmic [26] . The latter is given as follows: 
For instance, for full high-definition 1080p-resolution video and high-definition audio streaming services a minimum of 4.5Mbps is required although 9Mbps is recommended, and for 4K streaming services these values are 15Mbps and 25Mbps, respectively. Our model assumes that the utility of UE u of OP z is defined by its QoE. Then,
where equivalence enables the introduction of a simpler alternative notation.
IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Since problem (2) is intractable due to the interdependence between BS-to-UE associations and OP valuations of infrastructure resources, in this section we propose a heuristic three-phase framework to efficiently allocate NISs to OPs and associate UEs with NISs. Before introducing the framework, let us keep in mind the following proposition:
The proposition states that the total value function can be defined as a summation of local BS-level functions. Equality in (a) follows, since the QoE function of a UE only requires local information at the BS (i.e. number of RF chains and associations) and this is true under the signalto-noise ratio (SNR) regime in mmWave cellular networks (BS density less than 30 BS/Km 2 ), which is an assumption in our system model supported elsewhere ( [4] , [36] ).
The framework is illustrated in Fig. 2 and described as follows: (i) Phase I. Initial association. We assume that an initial association procedure ( Fig. 2a) is conducted between BSs B and UEs U following well-known association criteria in mmWave networks such as minimum path loss [2] , [4] , [23] , [24] . The resulting initial association is denoted by µ z I and can also be understood as an initial connectivity demand that the InP handles. In this way, the InP agent can provide OPs with the information they need to estimate which BSs are more appealing for their UEs (users may not be homogeneously distributed in space) and thus to bid accordingly for the offered infrastructure resources.
(ii) Phase II. Distributed auction across the BSs. Once the OPs know how to value infrastructure resources through µ z I , the auction begins and the OPs compete to obtain the NISs they desire. Considering Proposition 1, instead of running a centralized network-wide auction, the InP delegates the auction to its BS agents, which results in |B| parallel auctions (Fig. 2b) 
In addition, and also based on Proposition 1, the VCG price charged to OP j at BS b is:
and ρ j = b∈B ρ j b is the total price charged to OP j for NIS n z . However, instead of running a VCG algorithm locally at the BSs, we propose a multi-item Vicrey-Dutch auction. A sealed-bid VCG auction is complex to solve, requires either revelation of valuation functions ϕ z b (·) of OPs or valuations to be known for all items. This is too much unnecessary information, and OPs may simply be reluctant to share it anyway. We propose instead the simple iterative ''clinching'' auction [40] described in Section V, which yields the same VCG outcome (efficient allocations, VCG prices) in few rounds and motivates OPs to bid truthfully. (iii) Phase III. Re-association. Finally, once every OP has won a NIS n z at price ρ z , the objective of each OP z is to maximize its payoff z (value minus cost) in (4) . Note that when the auction terminates, some UEs may have lost their initial path-loss-based association (u 1 1 and u 3 1 in Fig. 2c ) if their OP failed to obtain a virtual BS in the desired location. For that reason, we denote by µ z A the resulting association when the auction process ends. At the same time, some UEs may prefer to replace their path-loss-based associations by another virtual BS nearby with more available resources (u 3 3 in Fig. 2c ). Therefore, we propose a re-association process (Fig. 2c) where each OP maximizes its payoff. In Phase III, each OP z ∈ Z solves the re-association (RA) problem:
where the dependence of the payoff function (4) with n z and ρ z disappears since these are given parameters. The RA problem is a binary combinatorial problem with exponential complexity O(|B| |U z | ) that every OP has to solve. In Section VI we solve it as a matching game [26] , [41] - [43] .
A. PRACTICAL NOTE
In practice, our framework can be triggered periodically to adapt to the time-varying nature of the mmWave channel. In addition, the virtualization of radio resources is in line with recent trends [44] and the 5G roadmap. Dynamic reconfiguration and resource scheduling at BSs via software is possible by relying on Software Defined Radio (SDR). An InP agent in each BS would handle the initial association procedure with the UEs, perform the auction, and implement the required elements (BBU and RF processing) for each OP, or would just receive I/Q data from a remote BBU implemented by the OP following a C-RAN approach.
V. DISTRIBUTED ITERATIVE AUCTION
In this section we present our proposal for an iterative descending auction algorithm (or clinching auction) to be run at all BS b ∈ B in parallel (see Fig. 2b ). In Proposition 1 we )). However, our model assumes that OPs initially take the path-lossbased association µ z I to value BSs. Therefore, the dependence on the association no longer holds and we can rewrite, from Proposition 1,
where the last equivalence (a) makes notation simpler, and where k is the number of RF chains considered and, thus,
In general, this property holds 1 with our valuation function Q u (·). Table 1 shows an example.
A. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
Let us define set Z −z = Z \ {z} and the collection of sets Z = {Z, Z −z } z∈Z , and letZ be an element of Z. We denote by E(Z) the main economy and by E(Z −z ) a marginal economy. economy E(Z) withZ ∈ Z is:
representing the allocation y b that maximizes revenue.
3) INP REVENUE AT A BS
The revenue of the InP for an allocation
4) COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM (CE)
Price matrix λ b and allocation y b are a CE of economy E(Z)
5) UNIVERSAL COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM (UCE)
Let λZ b withZ ⊂ Z be theZ-rows of λ b . A price matrix λ b is a UCE price matrix if λZ b is a CE price matrix of economy E(Z) for everyZ ∈ Z. A trivial UCE price matrix can be built by setting prices equal to valuations.
It has been shown that UCE price matrices are necessary and sufficient to derive the VCG outcome from a CE of the main economy [45] . Concretely, if λ b is a UCE price matrix, then the VCG price for OP z at BS b is:
where λ −z b is λ b without the z-row.
B. CLINCHING AUCTION
As its name suggests, the iterative auction is a sequential process between the OPs (buyers) and the InP (auctioneer) that is similar to the widely known English auction, where each iteration is called a ''round''. Let us denote a round by t. 
Algorithm 1 Iterative Auction at a BS.
Go to 1:
Go to 21: 16: else 17 : 
∀Z ∈ Z.
Next we illustrate the iterative multi-item Vicrey-Dutch descending auction with an example. Table 1 Table 2 illustrates the process. The auction begins with the highest marginal price m[0] ≥ 9 (at least). In iteration 1, for instance, the requested price is m[1] = 9 at which only OP 3 is interested in clinching 1 RF chain. The maximal demand is therefore {0, 0, 1}, and, since total demand (1) is less than supply (4), the demanded RF chain (n b [1] = {0, 0, 1}) is allocated to OP 3. In iteration 7 the CE of the main economy is reached ((t = 7) and demand (5) exceeds supply (4) for the first time) and the pricing mechanism starts based on the residual demands. In this iteration, all RF chains are already allocated (n b [7] = {2, 1, 1}) but only the RF chains in the residual demands are valued at the current requested price m [7] . The auction terminates when n b [9] = r b [9] , with all clinched RF chains with a price.
Proposition 2: Under truthful bidding and non-increasing marginals the clinching auction yields the VCG outcome (efficient allocations, VCG prices) at each BS and is ex-post efficient.
Proof: The proof follows by showing that, once we have reached the CE of the main economy (i.e. demand exceeds supply), the residual demand with the current marginal price in the given round provides sufficient information to calculate the VCG payments, i. Note that the computational complexity of the auction is very low, with simple linear operations in each round. Moreover, even though we do not expect the auction parameters to scale (number of RF chains, number of OPs), we have observed in simulations that the average number of rounds decreases with the number of RF chains and/or OPs.
VI. RE-ASSOCIATION
In this section we present the proposed deterministic and stochastic matching-based re-association algorithms for solving optimization problem (17) in phase III (see Section IV).
Since our framework satisfies the property of isolation between NISs, for ease of notation we consider an arbitrary OP z and we omit the ''z'' reference, i.e. the set of z-UEs U z is simply denoted by U, the z-matching µ z by µ, etc. Since any OP may obtain resources in any BS we still consider the full set B.
A. PRELIMINARIES. UTILITIES AND PREFERENCES
Our matching game (U, B, u , b ) consists of two sets of players U and B, where each UE u ∈ U is interested in being matched to one BS b ∈ B and each BS b ∈ B is interested in being matched to one or more UEs in U according to some preference relations ( u , b ), defined through proper utility functions.
Similarly as in Section II, let M be the set of all feasible matchings. We say that matching µ ∈ M if it satisfies the matching constraints, i.e. (i) the UE is connected to a single BS at most while the BS may be connected to any number of UEs, and (ii) if µ(u) = b then u ∈ µ(b).
Let us consider a UE u ∈ U, a matching µ and a NIS n = {n b } b∈B . The utility of the UE is therefore:
Similarly, the utility of a BS b ∈ B in NIS n under matching µ is defined as the sum of the utilities of the connected UEs, VOLUME 7, 2019 i.e.
With utilities ϕ b (µ), ϕ u (µ) defined, we next proceed to formalizing the preference relations ( u , b ) for the association process. A preference relation u is defined as a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation between the elements of a given set. Here, we call u the preference relation of player u and b u b if player u prefers b over b. Consider two matchings µ, µ ∈ M where µ(u) = j = µ (u) = j , and let j = {b, ∅} and j = {b , ∅} with j = j . Then, a preference relation u is defined over j and j as
Similarly, consider BS b ∈ B, two different subsets of UEs J = J and two matchings µ, µ ∈ M where µ(b) = J and µ (b) = J . A preference relation b is therefore defined over the UEs J and the UEs J as
The aim of each UE (BS) is to maximize its own utility or, equivalently, to become associated with the preferred BS (set of UEs). We consider that our matching game has externalities since a UE may prefer to migrate from the current BS to a different BS depending on other UE associations.
B. EXCHANGE MATCHING AND STABILITY
A matching game terminates when the final matching result is stable. However, there is no general mechanism to reach stable matching in the presence of externalities. The classic deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm [41] is only guaranteed to reach stable matching when preference relations are fixed (no externalities). The recent concept of swap-matching [42] , [46] is one approach to deal with externalities. However, an important limiting factor in our case is that it requires some initial matching and only involves swaps thereafter. This is because many UEs may lose connectivity after the auction (µ A ) and performing swaps in µ A may lead to a far from optimal stable solution, with OPs definitely not exploiting the NISs they win. To overcome this problem, we consider a novel exchange matching concept where we extend available operations with join and disjoin proposals. The general idea is to perform association changes (swap, join, disjoin) iteratively in the current matching until a stable matching is found.
We now formalize the definition of exchange matching and the conditions under which a matching µ is stable.
Definition 1: Given a matching µ, an exchange-matching µ ex ∈ {µ u bb , µ u −b , µ u b− } is a matching that results from an exchange operation (swap, join, disjoin) on current matching µ:
• Join. µ u −b = {µ ∪ (b , u)}, where u ∈ U and b ∈ B and µ(u) = ∅.
• Disjoin. µ u b− = {µ \ (b, u)}, where u ∈ U and b ∈ B and (b, u) ∈ µ. Note that an exchange-matching µ ex is also a matching and thus it satisfies matching constraints (µ ex ∈ M). Given the definition of an exchange-matching µ ex , where a user u can perform swap, join or disjoin operations on current matching µ, the conditions for a stable matching are as follows:
Definition 2: A matching µ is stable if there is no exchange-matching
In other words, given a current matching µ, an exchangematching µ ex exists when at least one of the players involved in the exchange strictly increases its utility without decreasing the utility of all other players in the game. When no exchange satisfies this condition, the current matching is already stable.
Next we develop the two novel algorithms DEM and SEM. The first is guaranteed to reach stable matching (See section VI-E). Even though reaching stable matching has been proven to outperform other greedy approaches in combinatorial problems, it does not necessarily mean that it yields the optimum of the optimization problem in (17) . For this reason, we also propose the SEM algorithm, which, as shown in VI-F, reaches the optimum of (17) .
In both algorithms, exchange proposals are based on local information but the decision to perform the proposed exchange is taken deterministically and probabilistically, respectively. In addition, the decision involves a relaxed condition that does not require all players involved in the exchange to maintain or improve their utility but simply to strictly increase the aggregated utility of the players.
C. DETERMINISTIC EXCHANGE MATCHING (DEM) ALGORITHM
Algorithm 2 describes DEM. First, the current matching µ is initialized to matching after the auction µ A (although the matching could be any type: empty set, random configuration, etc). Then the exchanges start. During this process, UE u updates its utility ϕ u (µ) under the current matching, and selects its preferred BS b from its auxiliary neighborhood (u) (initially, the set of BSs with a LOS or NLOS channel and with at least one RF chain, named here (u)). Depending on whether or not the UE u is already matched to a BS b, and depending on whether the selected preferred BS b is equal to b or not, the UE u will try different proposals: swap, join or disjoin.
Swap. This is the traditional case of swapping, where one player (a UE) swaps its current association (a BS) for another association (another BS). Disjoin. If the selected preferred BS b is the same as the current matched BS b, the UE u will disjoin the BS b = b it has already matched. We include this proposal, especially relevant for the stochastic version of the algorithm, as the counterpart of join. for u ∈ U z do 5: Update ϕ b (µ), ∀b ∈ B and ϕ u (µ), ∀u ∈ U.
6:
(u) = (u).
7:
repeat 8: Given current µ, get current BS b ← µ(u).
9:
Given current µ, get most preferred BS b in (u) .
10:
if b = b then 11: UE u sends a disjoin proposal to BS b .
12:
UE u sends a join proposal to BS b .
14:
UE u sends a swap proposal from BS b to BS b .
16:
end if 17 :
BS b accepts the proposal µ ex .
20:
Update current matching µ ← µ ex .
21:
else 22: BS b rejects the proposal µ ex .
23:
UE u deletes BS b from (u) .
24:
end if 25: until (u) = ∅.
26:
end for 27: until nSwap = 0. 28: Stable µ F ← µ.
Join. If the UE u is not currently matched to a BS, it will
join its preferred BS b under the current matching µ. This is crucial, since traditional matching algorithms assume that a connected network can perform swaps, so any UE may try to swap its current BS b with an alternative BS b . However, in our case we do not assume that the initial matching provides connectivity to all UEs due to the auction outcome (many UEs from µ I may have lost connection in µ A ). Another reason is that during the swap process any UE may disjoin its current BS as previously stated. Thus the reverse operation (disjoin) is needed.
After this step, even though a new matching µ ex is calculated, it is not yet accepted. Final acceptance is delegated to BS b , which is involved in the exchange. Therefore, on receiving the proposal, BS b calculates the local drift DEM
, and accepts it only when DEM L > 0. Otherwise, BS b rejects the proposal and UE u deletes BS b from its auxiliary neighborhood (u). UE u will try this process until either an exchange is accepted or its auxiliary neighborhood is empty.
Algorithm 3 Stochastic Exchange Matching
Update ϕ b (µ), ∀b ∈ B and ϕ u (µ), ∀u ∈ U.
4:
Pick a random BS b ∈ B.
5:
BS b selects a UE u at random from neighborhood (b) that is not matched to another BS b = b.
6:
UE u selects a BS b at random from neighborhood (u).
7:
if b = b then 8: if µ(u) = ∅ then 9: UE u sends a join proposal to BS b .
10:
UE u sends a disjoin proposal to BS b .
12:
end if 13 :
15:
else 16: UE u sends a swap proposal from BS b to BS b .
17:
end if 18 :
BS b calculates the acceptance probability γ ex . 20 :
BS b accepts proposal µ ex .
22:
23:
end if 24 :
µ best ← µ ex .
26:
end if 27: until Maximum number of iterations is reached. 28: Final matching: µ F ← µ.
A loop across the UEs is repeated until no exchange occurs. Since the last loop over the set of UEs does not produce any exchange from current matching µ, µ is already a stable matching and, thus, µ F ← µ.
D. STOCHASTIC EXCHANGE MATCHING (SEM) ALGORITHM
The SEM algorithm, shown in Algorithm 3, combines the advantages of matching theory and stochastic sampling. In SEM, exchanges (join, disjoin and swap) occur in a probabilistic fashion. One of the most celebrated stochastic sampling algorithms is the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm, originally proposed by Metropolis et al. [47] , and generalized by Hastings [48] to find the lowest energy configuration of the molecules within a box. Inspired by this algorithm, we propose a stochastic exchanging process that aims at achieving the maximum payoff in problem (17) . The initial matching is set to µ A (or an arbitrary matching), as in DEM. After initialization, the process consists of picking BSs at random, for instance BS b. The BS b then selects a neighbor UE u ∈ (b) at random, subject to the constraint that the chosen UE u cannot be already matched to another BS b = b. VOLUME 7, 2019 In other words, BS b only picks unmatched UEs of its own. BS b then, at random, also picks a BS b of the neighbor UE in its vicinity (b ∈ (u)). Similarly as in DEM, BS b may be BS b itself. The SEM algorithm distinguishes the following cases:
Case I. BS b is equal to BS b . In this case, UE u will try to join BS b = b or to disjoin BS b = b , depending on its current state (unmatched or already matched with BS b). Case II. BS b is different from BS b but UE u is not matched to either. In this case, UE u will try to join BS b . Case III. BS b is different from BS b and UE u is already matched to BS b. In this case, a swap is proposed, whereby UE u is detached from BS b and matched to BS b (iff the proposed swap is accepted).
After the proposal is sent, BS b calculates the local drift
> 0, and the exchange is accepted. However, if SEM L ≤ 0, the exchange may also occur with probability
. After an exchange has been made, the payoff (µ ex ) is computed and the resulting exchange-matching µ ex is stored if it is the best solution so far, i.e. (µ ex ) > (µ best ). This process of picking and attempted exchange is repeated, keeping the best solution until the maximum number of iterations is reached. The analogy with the MH algorithm is as follows. The picking process for a BS is equivalent to the random picking of a molecule in the MH algorithm, followed by the proposal of a random movement around the current position of the molecule (equivalent to a random exchange from the BS). If the new configuration of all system molecules yields a lower system energy configuration, the proposed new position of the molecule is accepted. Otherwise, it is accepted with a probability that is proportional to the increase of system energy. Running this process for enough iterations ultimately achieves optimal configuration of the molecules (optimum matching).
E. DEM PERFORMANCE
In this section we show that the DEM algorithm reaches stable matching. Given an NIS n and a price ρ, the payoff function in (4) is a function of µ. As stated before, in this section we omit superindex z for ease of notation.
Proposition 3: Given an NIS n with price ρ, an exchange under the DEM algorithm strictly increases payoff (·).
Proof: Here we need to show that exchanges only occur when the global drift G in the payoff increases, i.e. if an exchange takes place, then G > 0. By proving that the change in local drift DEM L corresponds to the same change in G the proof is complete. Next we provide the case of a swap exchange-matching µ u bb . Consider the following terms:
We break the two terms (µ u bb ) and (µ) down as follows:
Given the current matching µ, we know that all the remaining 
and
. A similar analysis may be applied to the join µ u −b and disjoin µ u b− exchange-matchings. Proposition 4: Given an NIS n with price ρ, the DEM algorithm returns stable matching µ.
Proof: From lemmas 1 and 2 in the Appendix, we show that any local maxima of the payoff function (·) correspond to a matching that satisfies stability conditions in Definition 2. The proof follows, considering the strictly increasing effect on the payoff function for any valid exchange-matching under DEM (Proposition 3).
F. SEM PERFORMANCE
The SEM algorithm can be seen as a sequence of random
In other words, SEM defines a Markov chain (MC)
{M i } i≥0 whose state space is the set of all feasible matchings µ ∈ M, and where the transitions to a new exchangematching M i+1 = µ ex only depend on the current matching M i = µ. This is true since, once the system is in state M i = µ, (i) it has a finite and constant set of neighbor matchings, and the process randomly samples one of them µ ex ∈ {µ u −b , µ u b− , µ u bb } depending on the current µ and UE u, and (ii) the acceptance probability depends on the drift in the payoff function SEM L = (µ ex ) − (µ) between the two states µ ex and µ, and this value does not depend on the past
For the convergence properties of the SEM algorithm, we need to show that a stationary distribution exists and that it is unique. This is because, if a stationary distribution does not exist, then the MC of the SEM process does not converge to ''anything''. On the other hand, if the MC process has several stationary distributions, then the chain converges to ''different'' places (e.g. communicating classes) in the state space, depending on the initial state µ init . This does not guarantee that the MC reaches the optimum state µ opt , since the MC may be trapped in different communication classes (even though there may be several states µ that produce the maximum payoff, not all classes are guaranteed to have one).
Proposition 5: The SEM algorithm converges to a unique stationary distribution.
Proof: We need to demonstrate that, regardless of the initial state M 0 = µ init , SEM converges to a stationary distribution and this stationary distribution is unique. A regular MC satisfies this property. An MC is regular if there exists some positive integer q such that, for every two states µ, µ in the state space M, it is possible to go from state µ to state µ in n steps (∃q > 0/∀µ, µ ∈ M, P q µ→µ > 0). There are two sufficient conditions for a MC to be regular: (a) it is possible to go from every state to every state (not necessarily in one move) (∀µ, µ ∈ M, ∃q > 0/P q µ→µ > 0), and (b) every state has self-transitions (∀µ ∈ M, P µ→µ > 0). First, SEM allows three types of variations from the current matching (or jumps from the current state): joining an unmatched UE, disjoining an already matched UE, and swapping a UE from its current BS to another (with a detectable channel, i.e. NLOS or LOS). Second, in SEM there is a non-zero probability of performing a change (jump) that decreases the payoff function . Assume that the current state is µ. There is a fixed and finite set of neighboring states to which µ can ''jump'' (a finite set of possible exchange-matchings µ → µ ex ). This is true since every UE u can perform a join or a swap with a finite set of BSs ( (u)) or a disjoin from the current BS (µ(u)). Since in Algorithm 3 the selected UE u picks one BS b at random from its neighborhood (u), all possible join/disjoin/swap exchange-matching ''states'' stand a chance of selection. In addition, all states with selftransitions are also satisfied, since every state has a non-zero probability of not performing a disjoin, a join, or a swap. As a consequence, the MC of the SEM algorithm is regular and the proof is concluded.
Proposition 6: Given an NIS n with price ρ, the SEM algorithm eventually reaches the optimal matching µ opt that is the solution of the re-association problem in (17) .
Proof: The number of matching configurations is finite, given a finite number of BSs, users and LOS/NLOS channel states. From Proposition 4 we also know that the MC of the SEM algorithm has a single communicating class where all possible optimum states are present. Since the MC is regular, there is a finite positive integer q such that, after q iterations, every state has a chance of being occupied, irrespective of the initial state. The optimal state(s) is(are) then eventually traversed. Since SEM keeps a record of best solutions, µ best → µ opt .
Corollary 1: Given an NIS n with price ρ, the SEM algorithm converges to stable matching µ.
Proof: This directly follows from Lemma 2 in the Appendix (i.e. any local/global maxima of the re-association optimization problem in (17) correspond to stable matching) and Proposition 6. However, there is no guarantee that the best matching encountered in a finite time is stable, but this situation can be subsequently remedied by applying the DEM algorithm.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we provide numerical results for our proposed three-phase framework. Table 3 shows the parameters used in all simulations unless explicitly stated otherwise.
As mentioned in the introduction, first we comprehensively show that infrastructure availability is far more critical than spectrum bandwidth in mmWave. Then we show how the proposed DEM and SEM algorithms outperform other representative association algorithms in mmWave. Finally, we provide experimental results for the proposed three-phase framework and illustrate how InP revenues greatly depend on the level of virtualization, which, in turn, is related to the number of RF chains, i.e. increasing the available number of RF chains at mmWave BSs decreases OP competition and is economically counterproductive from an InP perspective. Furthermore, we show that re-association significantly improves OP payoff, so that OPs can extract more value from their awarded NISs.
A. MOTIVATION FOR INFRASTRUCTURE SHARING IN MMWAVE CELLULAR NETWORKS
Due to the short range of small cells, BS density is critical to providing a good service. To illustrate this concept, we perform a simulation where we consider a single OP with 25 UEs and compare both the aggregated QoE of the UEs and the average number of UEs in OUT state in two situations: (a) Situation 1. The OP has a fixed number of already deployed BSs and wants to increase the QoE offered to its UEs by providing more mmWave bandwidth. Fig. 3a shows that the OP cannot obtain a high aggregated QoE for its UEs, 2 and that there is not a significant increase once a 75 MHz bandwidth is reached (a rather short bandwidth in mmWave). The main reason is that UEs in OUT situations or with low SNR will always have a null QoE, while connected UEs will not take advantage of a higher bandwidth after they reach the maximum QoE. (b) Situation 2. We assume the OP has its own fixed mmWave bandwidth and wants to provide better service by deploying more infrastructure. In this case, Fig. 3b shows a dramatic network performance increase with a denser mmWave infrastructure, even though the licensed bandwidth is still modest for mmWave (50 MHz). Again, the main reason for this behavior is that the chances of UEs having a non-blocked BS around increase.
As expected, mmWave OPs will require widespread BS deployment (high CapEx) from the very beginning to leverage the abundant mmWave bandwidth. Instead of deploying almost replicated dense infrastructure per OP to enter the mmWave market, an InP may share a common set of mmWave BSs through virtualization techniques and pricing mechanisms.
B. ASSOCIATION ALGORITHMS
In this section we compare the performance of our proposed DEM and SEM association algorithms Section VI) with other benchmarks. After the auction takes place in Phase II, each OP will have its own set of virtual mmWave BSs available (i.e. each OP will have an NIS). The proposed DEM and SEM algorithms are used during Phase III and are designed to maximize the payoff (value minus cost) of an OP, once the auction terminates, by optimally re-associating UEs within the NIS. As such, our algorithms can be tested regardless of the output of auction.
For the analysis, we assume SEM runs 5000 iterations. The benchmarks are random-based, path-loss-based and greedyrate-based association algorithms. Fig. 4a shows the average sum QoE of the OP for a growing number of UEs. Clearly, both SEM and DEM outperform the benchmarks and the gains increase with the number of UEs. We can also observe that SEM can achieve a better performance than DEM. Similar findings can be observed in Fig. 4b for a growing number of BSs. Fig. 5 shows the evolution of the aggregated QoE throughout the iterations for all the algorithms. For the same number of iterations DEM outperforms the other algorithms. The stochastic nature of SEM, which allows for exchanges in associations that do not necessarily increase the aggregated QoE, trades convergence speed for a higher aggregated QoE. Finally, Fig. 6 shows the average number of iterations until convergence for increasing network sizes, as a test of the scalability of DEM. It can be observed that DEM scales linearly with the number of nodes.
C. NIS ALLOCATION AND PRICING WITH DISTRIBUTED AUCTION
In this section we evaluate our proposed framework to price NISs and allocate them to OPs via a distributed BS auction (Phase I and Phase II), along with the optimization of the NISs awarded to the OPs via the re-association process (Phase III).
Figs. 7a-7b show the average outcome after the auction (30 realizations) for a growing amount of RF chains at the BSs. Note that more RF chains allow for ''greater virtualization''. Fig. 7a shows the evolution of average InP revenue and the average cost of an NIS for an OP.
Note that the results hold for any OP z ∈ Z, since we are considering homogeneous QoE and uniform drops of UEs. The revenue curve for the auction is in line with the expected results: (i) when the number of resources per BS approaches the number of OPs, both the competition and the revenue are low, and (ii) there is a region where the revenue is maximal and where the OPs observe high value in having more RF chains while supply (N RF b ) is substantially less than demand (|Z|). Note that total transmission power is divided among N RF b . Fig. 7b shows that slicing BSs in terms of RF chains increases the aggregated QoE dramatically. The main reason for the improved QoE with greater virtualization is that there is an increased chance of a generic UE obtaining access to a mmWave BS, thereby alleviating the OUT issue. Finally, we provide simulation results for the re-association process with DEM. We now consider |Z| = 4, w z = 200 MHz ∀z ∈ Z, |B| = 9 (in grid) and two cases with |U z | = 50 and |U z | = 100, ∀z ∈ Z, both with heterogeneous QoE. Fig. 8 compares the average payoff of the OPs with and without re-association of the UEs after the auction. Payment curves are shown for completeness. Clearly, applying Phase III after the auction yields huge OP payoff gains in all cases (N RF b ) and this gain increases with the number of UEs. In addition, the shape of the payment curves is similar to the case depicted in Fig. 7a .
VIII. CONCLUSION
The abundant spectrum that mmWave bands will release has become an essential enabler to tackle the 1000x capacity challenge for 5G communications and beyond. While it is true that mmWave paves the way to multi-Gbps data rates, its sensitivity to propagation blocking issues is a barrier that needs to be overcome with a dense infrastructure of BSs to provide seamless coverage in urban environments. This is troublesome when several OPs co-exist. This situation has been corroborated by our results, according to which larger bandwidth will only improve performance once the OUT issue is circumvented via denser infrastructure. From a business point of view, OPs may encounter difficulties in entering the new mmWave market unless neutral infrastructure vendors provide the BSs.
For this reason, we have proposed an economic three-phase framework where an InP leases the infrastructure to OPs that own rights to spectrum frequencies (a probable scenario in early mmWave deployment). In line with wireless network virtualization and slicing trends for 5G and beyond, the InP ''slices'' the BSs in RF chains to enhance flexibility and improve utility, so that several OPs may use the same physical BS. Our framework involves a distributed auction across the BSs that facilitates practical implementation. Moreover, the iterative nature of the auction makes it suitable for private value environments where OPs do not wish to reveal their value functions. In this sense, the proposed auction may consist of private agents running at the edge. Moreover, the proposed auction incentivizes OPs to bid with true values and yields the VCG outcome, which means that it is also efficient and individually rational. Our simulation results are coherent with the expectations. On the one hand, greater competition between OPs (few RF chains) improves InP revenue and vice versa. On the other hand, slicing mmWave BSs in RF chains significantly improves OP performance metrics since it basically circumvents the OUT issue by increasing the chances for a UE to access a BS around.
Our proposed framework also involves optimization of the resources each OP obtains after auctioning terminates, since the re-association of the UEs within the NIS in Phase III contributes to maximizing OP payoff. In this regard, we have designed deterministic and stochastic exchange-matching algorithms, and demonstrate their convergence to stable and stable-optimal matchings, respectively. In our simulations we have observed that our algorithms outperform representative association benchmarks and, in addition, that applying them after the auction provides large payoff gains to the OPs.
Our framework may be applied periodically to adapt itself to network changes and so that OP infrastructure can be dynamically adapted to UE locations and demands.
APPENDIX

Lemma 1: Any exchange-matching under auxiliary policy π increases payoff (·) strictly.
Proof: In the following we only consider swap exchange-matchings. Assume that the auxiliary policy π is executed. Under π the payoff changes as follows: 
Since the swap only changes players in {b, b , µ(b), µ(b )} and their utilities, the matching of the remaining players does not change (µ u bb (b ) = µ(b ), ∀b ∈ B, ∀u ∈ U / ∈ {b, b , µ(b), µ(b )}). Hence, the last terms in (29) and (30) are the same. Now, we rewrite the change in the payoff as: Therefore, any swap matching under policy π increases the payoff strictly ( π (µ u bb ) − π (µ) > 0). Following a similar procedure the same conclusion is found for join µ u −b and disjoin µ u b− exchange-matchings, which we omit here for brevity. Hence, π (µ ex ) − π (µ) > 0.
Lemma 2: All local maxima of the payoff function (·) are stable.
Proof: Assume that the auxiliary policy π is executed. Let us assume that one final matching µ of the auxiliary algorithm π returns a local maxima of the payoff function. Let us assume that this matching µ is unstable. Since the exchanges under the auxiliary algorithm increase (·) (Lemma 1) strictly, this contradicts that µ is a local or global maximum.
